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DTSTART:20131027T030000
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DTSTART:20130331T020000
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UID:calendar.6695.field_data.0@oba.diag.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260408T164645Z
CREATED:20130625T101512Z
DESCRIPTION:This paper analyzes third-degree price discrimination of a mono
 poly airline when markets are interdependent because of congestion. The mo
 del features business and leisure passenger markets\, where the business p
 assenger demand is inelastic relative to leisure passenger demand and busi
 ness passengers exhibit a high time valuation relative to leisure passenge
 rs. There are two types of prices: ticket-prices and full fares\, where th
 e latter are composed of ticket-prices and per-passenger congestion costs.
  In this set-up\, ticket-price discrimination can reduce or increase ticke
 t-prices or full fares in all markets relative to a scenario with uniform 
 ticket-prices. Furthermore\, we identify a time-valuation effect of ticket
 -price discrimination\, which works into the opposite direction than the w
 ell known output effect. Discriminating ticket-prices can therefore increa
 se welfare when this is associated with a reduction in the aggregate passe
 nger quantity.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20130703T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20130703T130000
LAST-MODIFIED:20130702T111318Z
LOCATION:Aula Magna - DIAG
SUMMARY:Monopoly Price Discrimination when Markets are Interdependent - Pro
 f. Anming Zhang\, Univeristy of British Columbia
URL;TYPE=URI:http://oba.diag.uniroma1.it/node/6695
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