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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Eventi DIAG
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20241027T030000
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DTSTART:20250330T020000
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UID:calendar.28697.field_data.0@oba.diag.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260404T231616Z
CREATED:20250321T134605Z
DESCRIPTION:AbstractMatching markets have diverse applications\, ranging fr
 om kidney transplantation to internship assignments. This talk focuses on 
 many-to-one stable matching in the context of school choice. These are two
 -sided markets comprising students (children) and schools\, which hold pre
 ferences and priorities\, respectively\, over one another. We begin by exp
 loring classic game theory concepts that underpin these market-matching me
 chanisms\, notably stability. Motivated by the Chilean school choice syste
 m\, we use integer programming to model mechanisms that not only determine
  matchings between students and schools but also allocate additional seats
  to schools to optimize student welfare. Finally\, we also discuss the use
  of integer programming to prioritize students with siblings and match the
 m together.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250325T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250325T120000
LAST-MODIFIED:20250321T140908Z
LOCATION:Aula Magna DIAG\, Via Ariosto 25
SUMMARY:Integer programming for many-to-one stable matchings - Margarida Ca
 rvalho
URL;TYPE=URI:http://oba.diag.uniroma1.it/node/28697
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